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labor, fall far short of the rigidly scientific standards set by Professor Moore's publications of twenty-odd years ago. To mention just one point, it seems incredible that a scholar living in Oxford should have contented himself with the notoriously inadequate and unreliable footnotes of Kittel's edition of the Hebrew Bible for the readings of a text so important for the Book of Judges as that of the Codex Lugdunensis.

Such spellings as Joshua', Hosea', Gide'on, Cana'an, Cana'anite, are neither English nor transliterated Hebrew.

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THE PRESENT CONFLICT OF IDEALS. A STUDY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF THE WORLD WAR. RALPH BARTON PERRY. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1918. Pp. xiii, 549.

Professor Perry has given his readers two books in one; the first an examination of the moral and religious aspects of contemporary philosophical tendencies, the second a study of the national characteristics and the political traditions of Germany, France, Great Britain, and the United States. The dozen chapters which make up the latter part of the volume belong essentially to the literature of the war, and have now lost some, though by no means all, of their pertinency and interest. But the conflict with which most of the book deals has its seat chiefly in men's minds, and its fighting lines are drawn without regard to national boundaries. It is not, in spite of the title, merely a conflict of "ideals" which Professor Perry describes; it is more largely with rival conceptions of the general nature of things, of the implications of man's cognitive and moral experience, of the relation to human interests and ideals of the reality which envelops them, that he is concerned. The book, in short, has even more to do with the philosophy of religion, in the broadest sense of the term, than with ethics; though no single label could easily do justice to the range of its themes. Few of the more significant tendencies of contemporary thought are left unconsidered. Nor does Professor Perry, in the present volume, limit his interest to the philosophy of the schools. Strindberg and Maeterlinck find their place along with the more technical moralists; neither "Billy" Sunday nor George Moore is altogether ignored, among the samples of the mind of the twentieth century, and Ian Hay jostles Hegel in the

index. I know of no single book in English which at once surveys so widely and interprets, in the main, so understandingly the movement of ideas in our time, or comes so near to being a comprehensive record and analysis of the thoughts which our generation has had concerning the world we live in and the meaning of life. Professor Perry has the gift of condensing without distorting, and of being brief without being obscure; and he has therefore been able to crowd into some four hundred pages a remarkable wealth both of lucid exposition and of significant criticism.

When a book ranges over so many and so diverse issues, the reviewer must necessarily select, for serious critical discussion, only one or two of its theses. The readers of this Review will perhaps look with most interest for Professor Perry's account of the religious and practical implications of the "neo-realistic" teaching of the group of American philosophers to which he belongs. One finds with some surprise that but a single chapter is devoted to this subject, though "realism" is one of the four generic types of contemporary philosophy under which the author attempts, rather unsuccessfully, to subsume the entire mass of contemporary opinions which he sets forth — the other three being "naturalism," "idealism" and "pragmatism."

It is essential to distinguish first between those elements of Professor Perry's practical philosophy which result from his neo-realistic principles, and those which he happens to hold on quite other grounds. This distinction he himself tends to forget. "Realism," he tells us, "is theistic in its religion." But in point of fact, from neo-realism as a premise the truth of theism is very certainly not deducible. All that Professor Perry can legitimately mean is that he sees in realism no repugnancy to some kind of theistic faith, and that, for his part, he accepts such a faith. *Why* he does so, what "arguments for the existence of God" he finds convincing, he nowhere intimates. But he does not leave us in much doubt as to the kind of God he believes in. It is the temporal, finite, and struggling God of J. S. Mill and William James, of Mr. Wells and a growing company of our contemporaries. This temporalistic theology has obvious affinities with realism, inasmuch as it is irreconcilable with a genuinely idealistic epistemology. Consistent idealism is bound to conceive "true reality" as eternally complete, comprehending all time and all experience in its absolute unity. But a temporalistic theology is not necessarily irreconcilable with a spiritualistic metaphysics; and in any case, its affinity is not specifically with the "new" realism but with realism in general.

When then we look for the moral and religious implications which are distinctive of this newer philosophy, we find apparently only two. In the first place, we are told, the neo-realist "accepts the mathematical and logical part of the Platonic realism;" that is, he holds that the properties and relations of universals, "the necessities of logical implication," are existent facts independent of mind, just as he holds that physical objects, their relations and interactions, are independent existents. And this "strain of Platonic realism" has certain implications "of emotional and practical significance." For example, it excludes pure materialism; for the universals are of course neither corporeal nor psychical, but "neutral" with respect to the psycho-physical distinction. And in the contemplation of this realm of supersensible realities and timeless truths some neo-realists find a species of religious satisfaction and of consolation for the futilities of the temporal order. Some neo-realists; but hardly Professor Perry himself. For he is not one of those who see in these cold and barren ecstasies of the logician the end and consummation of human life; nor is it sufficient for him to know merely that, though all man's hopes were frustrate and all man's efforts vain, nevertheless "truth is so." His interest is manifestly in the business of the temporal universe; it is a "religion of action" that appeals to him. And such a religion is possible only if we have some assurance that we live in a world in which man's deliberations and discoveries, his purposes and deeds, are relevant and efficacious, and his ideals have at least a fighting chance of fulfillment.

It is, Professor Perry thinks, a distinguishing merit of neo-realism that it is "the only philosophy to provide such a world." It alone can without inconsistency "admit consciousness into the natural world as a genuine dynamic agent." Absolute idealism fails to do this because of its conception of "reality" as eternally complete and perfect, and as requiring as predeterminate ingredients in its perfection both all the finite evil and all the finite good that actual experience contains. But for a very different reason Professor Perry finds that the older or dualistic kind of realism is equally incapable of giving significance to human action. For it regards consciousness "as a peculiar substance, absolutely distinct from corporeal substance," and therefore as "incapable of entering into any commerce with it." Neo-realism, however, maintains the doctrine of the "immanence of consciousness"; it declares that mind is "homogeneous with its environment" and therefore "interactive with it."

This contrast between the "new" or monistic and the dualistic realism seems to me to limp upon both its legs. It is not the case,

on the one hand, that all or most dualistic realists infer from the distinction between minds or ideas and their external objects that the former are "incapable of entering into any commerce" with the latter. Doubtless Professor Perry thinks that dualists *ought* to draw such an inference; but as he offers no argument to show why they ought, he must be said to deal in a rather dogmatic and cavalier fashion with an important and difficult issue. On the other hand, it is not the case that monistic realism admits anything which can significantly and distinctively be called "mind" or "consciousness" into the natural world as a dynamic agent.

For when the neo-realist tells us that consciousness is "homogeneous" with the physical environment, he is, with some delicacy of language, denying that anything resembling what both philosophers and laymen have hitherto meant by "consciousness" exists at all. Consciousness, as commonly conceived, has certain definite attributes and powers. It can, as men have supposed, look before and after, representing both past and future in present ideas without thereby making either past or future actual. It can dream dreams, evoking images of things which do not exist, and of some which never can exist, in the physical world. It can apprehend meanings and "references" and can, in its deliberations, feel the constraining force of purely logical necessities. And it can take the form of moral self-consciousness, and, even in the act of making the interests of other selves its own, find the significance and the glow of this experience in the knowledge that those selves are not "immanent" in itself but are truly other — are distinct and independent bearers of values and possessors of interests. But a so-called "consciousness" which is strictly "homogeneous" with the external environment — which "differs from bodies very much [*sic*; the author should in consistency have said "simply"] as one bodily system differs from another" — can possess none of these powers or attributes; for the external environment, as science represents it, knows naught of them, and "bodily systems" are "bodily" only in so far as they lack them. No doubt the neo-realist would reply that his "strain of Platonic realism" saves him here; that at least meanings, logical relations, values, are for him a part of the total objective (but not exclusively material) order which constitutes the environment of the human organism, and can therefore properly be included by him among the contents of a consciousness homogeneous with that environment. Yet the reply does not meet the difficulty. For it is only as universals that these "neutral entities" find a place in the neo-realist's universe. But a pure universal, unindividuated, existing neither in

time nor space, obviously cannot be a "dynamic agent in the natural world." In short, the realm of Platonic ideas contains elements resembling certain of the distinctive elements of consciousness, but it cannot act; matter can in some sense act, but it contains nothing resembling the distinctive elements of consciousness. But as the whole of reality is, for the neo-realist, made up exclusively of these two parts — of Platonic universals *plus* material particles diversely arranged in space and time — his scheme of things nowhere affords room for any reality which *both* possesses the actual properties of consciousness and also is capable of being "a genuine dynamic agent."

In its metaphysics, in short, neo-realism is — but for its otiose appendage of Platonic realism — a soft-spoken, if not a "tender-minded," materialism. This appears most plainly of all perhaps in Professor Perry's intimation that when the new realism speaks of "mind" it uses the word in a purely "behavioristic" sense. Now behaviorism as a method of experimental inquiry in psychology has its place and finds practical justification in its results. But behaviorism as a metaphysics is simply naturalism gone mad. It conceives the whole process of consciousness in terms of physical stimulus and bodily response. It recognizes in the experience of an individual no elements which are not, at least potentially, wholly open to the direct sensible observation of other individuals — no elements, in other words, which are anything more than visible or tangible movements of the muscles or other parts of the animal mechanism. In all this, it incidentally stultifies itself; for the behaviorist philosopher puts forward his doctrine as meaningful and true, and as reached through logical processes — and yet "truth" and "meaning" can have no place among the strictly behavioristic categories, and the theory cannot recognize any such thing as the determination of the action of an animal (even though the animal be a philosopher) by logical reflection as such. If we apply the behaviorist's principles to himself, we must treat his arguments and conclusions merely as so much "animal behavior," that is, as movements of the muscles of (*e.g.*) his throat or forearm, and as nothing more.

Yet of course Professor Perry does not follow his premises out to the absurdities in which they logically result; nor — as has been seen — does he himself discover in his neo-realism the practical implications which are proper to it. On the contrary, through a considerable part of the book he carries on a vigorous polemic against naturalism; and his own practical philosophy is eminently sane, humanistic, insistent upon the efficacy of ideas and of ideals, upon the potency of man's reason both in the direction of his bodily be-

havior and the modification of his physical environment. This happy inconsistency (as it appears to me to be) seems to have come about, in Professor Perry's case as in others, in a simple and natural way. His reflection upon the problem of perceptual knowledge early persuaded him that the possibility of such knowledge is inconceivable unless the object perceived and the percept "in consciousness" are literally identical. This "epistemological monism" (being construed realistically rather than idealistically) was then converted, logically enough, into a psychophysical monism, into the doctrine that consciousness, or the content and processes which make it up, are "homogeneous" with the physical environment. But having thus metaphysically identified "mind" with "bodily systems," the new realist then quietly reads into the "bodily systems" the contents, relations, and activities which he knows, and everybody knows, actually to belong to our experience, however foreign to the physicist's conception of the properties and motion of matter. The psychical lamb, in short, is supposed to be swallowed by the materialistic lion; but when, after blood-curdling growls and the crunching of tender bones, the deglutition is finished, what appears before one is not a lion but a lamb. Yet the legerdermain by which this reassuring substitution is accomplished will hardly escape the observant spectator; nor can I believe that Professor Perry himself will remain permanently unaware of it.

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THE SPREAD OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE MODERN WORLD. EDWARD CALDWELL MOORE. (University of Chicago Publications in Religious Education. Handbooks of Ethics and Religion.) University of Chicago Press. 1919. Pp. xi, 352. \$2.00.

In the large and rapidly filling section devoted to "Missions" in all the larger institutional libraries there may be found at least a couple of shelves of books dealing with the special subject, "History of Missions." Here are books attempting to cover the entire history as well as monographs treating various periods and fields, like Lemuel C. Barnes' *Two Thousand Years of Missions before Carey*, G. F. Maclear's *History of Christian Missions during the Middle Ages*, and Julius Richter's *History of Protestant Missions in the Near East*. A brief historical review of the special point of view of these historical books will disclose pertinently the nature of the change which has taken place in the concept of Christianity and of Christian Missions.